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An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers' Responsibility for Drug-related Injuries
under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960's there has been a continuing rise in litigation
related to prescription drugs.1 Although pharmaceuticals have
many salutary purposes and life-saving potential, the hazards of
ethical2 drugs for therapeutic purposes have become patently clear
in the past two decades.3 Diverse injuries, many of which are virtu-
ally nonexistent outside of their drug-related incidence, can have
catastrophic effects on the lives of unsuspecting patients. When
1. See generally Keeton, Products Liability - Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L.
REv. 131 (1972); Rheingold, Products Liability - The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liabil-
ity, 18 RUTGERs L. REv. 947 (1964); Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
for Unforseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FORDHAm L. Rav. 735 (1980).
2. Webster's 9th New Collegiate Dictionary provides a definition of "ethical" in this
context as follows: "When said of a drug, restricted to sale only on a doctor's prescription."
WEsTER's 9TH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (9th ed. 1983).
3. Approximately 1.3 million drug reactions per year which demand medical care or
lead to work loss include complications from blood transfusions and vaccinations. See
Rheingold, supra note 1, at 947 n.2. For discussion concerning drug-related congenital de-
fects, see 1 M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LuRILrrY, ch. 4A (MB) (1983).
4. A prime example of a drug-related malady, virtually unknown before it was linked
with diethylstilbestrol (DES) exposure in utero is vaginal adenocarcinoma (clear cell cancer
of the vagina). See Uelfelder, The Stilbestrol-Adenosis-Carcinoma Syndrome, 38 CANcER
426, 428-30 (1976). Problems associated with treating gynecological injuries and abnormali-
ties which are typical of DES and related synthetic estrogens include mothers that may not
be aware that they were given DES, medical records that may be lost or destroyed, and
tissue abnormalities of the offspring that may not show up in routine pelvic exams until the
cell changes have progressed to a dangerous stage. See generally Herbst, Scully & Robboy,
Problems in the Examination of the DES-exposed Female, 46 ORs'rE. & GYNECOL. 353
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Herbst, Problems]; Herbst, Cole, Robboy & Scully, Age Inci-
dence and Risk for Diethylstilbestrol-related Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina
and Cervix, 128 Am. J. OBSTET. & GYNqcOL. 43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Herbst, Age
Incidence and Risk].
Another example of a drug which caused severe birth defects is Thalidomide, a sedative.
Gross skeletal deformities such as flipper-like legs and hands (phocomelia) were associated
with the drug. See McBride, Thalidomide embryopathy, 16 TERATOLOGY 79 (1977). The
1962 drug amendments were in part a reaction to the Thalidomide disaster. See Note, The
Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 RTrrGERS L. REv. 101 (1963).
The anti-nauseant Bedectin has been associated with limb deformities and other congen-
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such injury occurs, if a plaintiff cannot prove that the manufac-
turer was unreasonable in negligently marketing the drug, can he
or she still obtain legal relief from the defendant drug house? If a
seller of drugs is to be held to the same standard of liability as
other manufacturers of consumer products, the answer is yes. Yet,
much confusion has existed concerning the purpose and effect of
comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,6
an important guide to the resolution of the preceding question.
Many courts and commentators have interpreted the comment as
creating an exemption from strict liability for producers of
pharmaceuticals, as the language suggests.' The purpose of this
tial defects similar to those related to Thalidomide. Personal injury law suits alleging pre-
natal injuries resulting from Bendectin exposure were recently consolidated for pre-trial
purposes in the Southern District of Ohio in Multi-District Litigation No. 486. In an order
discharging the impaneled jury, signed on July 14, 1984, Chief Judge Carl B. Rubin set forth
the conditions of a proposed one hundred twenty million dollar ($120,000,000) trust fund to
be established for the Bendectin victims. Although certain technicalities are still pending at
the time of this writing, concerning certain aspects of the fund and the class it protects, this
settlement is a landmark in prescription drug liability litigation.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment k (1965). See McClellan, Strict
Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion through the Maze of Products Liability,
Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 2 (1978). Professor McClellan's
article provides an exhaustive treatment of these theories of products liability, and was a
catalyst for the genesis of this comment. Section 402A sets forth the statutory basis of strict
liability of suppliers of goods that cause physical harm to a user or consumer. Comment k of
that section is the source of the problematic language concerning the liability of drug manu-
facturers for harm caused by their products. Comment k provides in pertinent part:
There are some products which ... are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use.. .. Such a product, properly prepared and accompanied
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
.. . It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs, as to which,
because of the lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there
can be no assurance of safety. . .. The seller of such products, again with the qualifi-
cation that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment k (1965) (emphasis in original).
6. See Campbell, Civil Liability for Investigational Drugs: Part II, 42 TEMP. L. Q.
289, 333 (1969). Although Professor Campbell admits that there may be a possible argument
for imposing strict liability upon a manufacturer, he contends that drug manufacturers
ought not to be made insurers of their products. Id. Furthermore, he argues that a drug
should only be considered to be unreasonably dangerous in instances where no reasonable
drug manufacturer would market such h drug, and where no reasonable physician would
administer it. Id. Such a focus on the conduct of the manufacturer illustrates a major snarl
in this area of products liability law. See also Note, supra note 1, at 759.
The following cases, which will be treated in detail in this comment, illustrate the fact
that recent court decisions continue to use comment k as a basis to exempt drug manufac-
turers from liability for injuries resulting from their products: DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs.,
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comment is to consider the goals of strict liability in drug-related
injuries, how strict liability law differs in practice and concept
from negligence law, and why favorable treatment in the terms of
exemption from strict liability of drug companies for injurious
products undermines the purpose of strict liability law.
II. THE ORIGINS OF STRICT LIABILITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
FOOD AND DRUGS
A. Origins of the Relationship
In thirteenth century England those who were in the business of
preparing or selling food did so at the risk of criminal sanctions for
vending "corrupt" food and drink.7 .In early twentieth century
America, courts began to hold food merchants accountable to the
consumer without proof of any negligence or privity of contract.
These incipient stages of strict liability manifested themselves in
complicated legal fictions, based ultimately on negligence or con-
tract concepts.8 Finally, as judicial opinions began to assess liabil-
ity in such cases on a theory straightforwardly independent of neg-
ligence or contract law, the beginnings of today's strict liability law
started to emerge.9
Although the April 1961, Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Restate-
ment (Second) included a strict liability section which extended
only to "food for human consumption," 10 courts since 1950 had
been extending the rule of strict liability to "products intended for
697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (1978); Feldman
v. Lederle Labs., 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (1983); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175
N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980); Seley v. Searle, 67 Ohio St.2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831
(1981).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment b, (1965).
8. Id. Such theories include an agency relationship between the retailer and con-
sumer or retailer and original seller; a third party beneficiary relationship; and a warranty
"running with the goods," Id. These complicated efforts by the courts to impose responsibil-
ity for manufacturing or design defects on the seller of goods, undertaken within the more
familiar context of contract or negligence law, demonstrate the reluctance of the judiciary to
expand strict products liability.
9. Id. See Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis.2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (liability
for bone found in chicken sandwich); Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, 93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957)
(worms in canned spinach); Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 332
P.2d 258 (1958) (slime in soft drink); Willis v. Safeway Stores, 199 Misc. 821, 105 N.Y.S.2d 9
(1951) (cork pieces in drink).
10. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). See Putnam v.
Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1964).
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intimate body use" including cosmetics and drugs." Tentative
Draft No. 7 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts broadened the
scope of strict liability law from food products only to drugs and
other products "of an intimate character.""2 Although the Restate-
ment finally applied the rule of strict liability to all products, it is
apparent that pharmaceuticals and other analogous commodities
fell within the early contemplation of strict liability law. It is irony
in its truest sense that drug manufacturers should now be excluded
from strict liability by the courts on the basis of comment k when
their products occupied a place in the original genre of commodi-
ties considered especially appropriate for the application of liabil-
ity without fault.
B. The Purpose of Strict Liability
The goals of strict liability as contrasted to those of negligence
were enunciated by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court in an early products liability case, Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co. of Fresno."' In Escola, the plaintiff alleged that she was
injured when a Coca-Cola bottle broke in her hand." The majority
resolved the controversy on a theory of res ipsa loquitur, stating
that the bottle must have been defective when it left the manufac-
turer's control, because the explosion of bottles of carbonated
drink ordinarily would not occur outside of negligence on the part
of the bottling company. 15 Although the court's inference of negli-
gence allowed recovery for the injured plaintiff, Justice Traynor
wrote a concurring opinion which shifted the focus from the con-
duct of the manufacturer to the product itself:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury, and the loss of time or health may be
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for
the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer, and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business .... It is to the public interest
to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the
manufacturer,who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the
product, is responsible for its reaching the market .... The inference of
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment b (1965).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). Such items
included chewing gum, chewing tobacco, snuff, cigarettes, clothing, soap, cosmetics, lini-
ments, hair dye and permanent wave solutions, as well as drugs. See Putnam, 338 F.2d at
918-19 n.16.
13. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
14. Id. at 454, 150 P.2d at 437.
15. Id. at 456-57, 150 P.2d at 439-40.
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negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper care....
An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such
evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar
with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is. In leaving it
to the jury to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of
the evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict lia-
bility. It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery
and impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If public policy
demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality re-
gardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility
openly. (emphasis added)1
Justice Traynor's discussion included the fact that food
merchants were subject to strict liability on the basis of warranty,
as well as criminal statutes, and that retailers, in general, were sub-
ject to absolute liability through the implied warranty of fitness
and merchantability. 17 The pervading theme of his opinion was
that the manufacturer maintained the best position to test and
control the quality of his product, as well as a superior position to
cover any loss or damage that might result from his product.18 Jus-
tice Traynor's opinion in Escola anticipated the acknowledged
purpose of Section 402A." The goal of strict liability derives from
an economic and ethical allocation of responsibility for loss to the
source of the defective, injury-producing product rather than from
fault. It is the manufacturer who is most prepared to prevent dam-
age or bear its burden should it occur. Such a perspective looks to
the product which causes the harm, not the conduct of the one who
places it in commerce.20
16. Id. at 458, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 459-60, 150 P.2d at 441-42 (Traynor, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 459-61, 150 P.2d at 441-43 (Traynor, J., concurring).
19. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment c (1965). Comment c provides
a summary of the purpose of strict liability:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who
may be injured by it; that the public has a right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputa-
ble sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden
of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it
are those who market the products.
Id.
20. For a scholarly analysis of this perspective, see Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler &
Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425
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III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF COMMENT K TO DRUG CASES
Since many drug controversies can be litigated and resolved on
negligence grounds, not all courts address the complicated and
seemingly contradictory issues21 germane to comment k's guide-
lines for strict liability of drug manufacturers. 2 This section will
highlight some recent opinions in the area of drug induced injuries
with a view toward variations in judicial treatment of comment k.25
A. Plaintiff's Recovery In Strict Liability Not Precluded By
Comment k.
Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co.24 tells the story of a young woman
afflicted with DES-related adenocarcinoma at the age of seventeen.
After a surgical bout with the disease which included a radical hys-
terectomy and partial vaginectomy, Bichler and her father sued
the manufacturer, the pharmacist and prescribing physician. She
recovered a verdict against Eli Lilly on a theory of concerted action
among the drug manufacturers which sought Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) approval of DES and marketed it for the pre-
vention of miscarriage .2  Although the plaintiff won at the trial
level, the case was appealed to the appellate division of the Su-
(1974). Although this article is an interdisciplinary study undertaken primarily to explore
the role of the technological expert in products liability litigation, underlying the entire
article is the pivotal focus on the unreasonably dangerous product- "The shift from negli-
gence to strict liability requires, if nothing else, that the inquiry be focused on the product
and the use of the product and away from what the manufacturer should or should not have
done or foreseen." Id. at 429.
21. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 1001 n.304. These commentators maintain that
the policy behind comment k which seeks to safeguard the manufacturers of valuable drugs
from liability for harm resulting from these products would actually eliminate the type of
actions which § 402A intended to cover.
22. Comment k provides, in pertinent part-
Unavoidably Unsafe Products:
There are some products which in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are espe-
cially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damag-
ing consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, not-
withstanding the unavoidably high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defec-
tive, nor is it unreasonably dangerous ....
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965) (emphasis in original). See also
supra note 5.
23. See McClellan, supra note 5, for a thorough analysis of earlier case law.
24. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 436 N.E.2d 182 (1982). See also supra note 4.
25. Id. at 577-78, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79, 436 N.E.2d at 184-85.
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preme Court and later to the New York Court of Appeals.2" On
appeal to the appellate division, defendant Eli Lilly contended
that the trial court erred in not charging the jury properly on the
issue of forseeability in strict liability.27 The president judge re-
jected this assertion in the appellate court opinion.28 The language
of the jury instructions at issue are quite pertinent to this discus-
sion, however. The trial court charged the jury that, in order to
find whether DES was "reasonably safe",2 9 the panel had to deter-
mine whether a reasonable manufacturer would have marketed the
drug if present knowledge of the drug's effect had been known in
1953.30 Such a charge accords with strict liability principles, and
imputes knowledge 1 of the drug's carcinogenic and mutagenic
qualities to the manufacturer. 82 The court did not charge the jury
on the issue of forseeability directly related to Lilly's marketing of
the drug, but rather on the issue of whether Lilly and other DES
manufacturers should have foreseen that DES could have cancer-
ous effects on offspring exposed in utero.5 Forseeability in this
26. Id. at 578-79, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779, 436 N.E.2d at 185. See also supra note 4.
27. Id. at 579, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779, 436 N.E.2d at 185.
28. Id. at 586, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 783, 436 N.E.2d at 189. The defendant contended that
it could not have foreseen the occurrence of DES-caused cancer in human offspring in 1947.
The New York Court of Appeals rejected this on two bases: First, the court hesitated to
disturb the jury's verdict which was based on proof offered by the plaintiff's experts. Sec-
ond, the court referred to testimony regarding medical research conducted in 1947 on mice
concerning the transplacental effects on the offspring of an anesthetic administered during
delivery. Id.
29. Id. at 587 n.10, 436 N.E.2d at 189 n.10, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 783 n.10. "Reasonably
safe" was the court's alternative to the negatively phrased "unreasonably dangerous" lan-
guage of § 402A.
30. Id.
31. A landmark case where the manufacturer was imputed with knowledge of his
product's dangerous quality is Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033
(1974), where the court noted their modification of jury instructions suggested by Professor
Wade as follows:
The law imputes to a manufacturer [supplier] knowledge of the harmful character of
his product whether he actually knows of it or not. He is presumed to know of the
harmful character of his product whether he actually knows of it or not. He is pre-
sumed to know of the harmful characteristics of that which he makes [supplies].
Therefore a product is dangerously defective if it is so harmful to persons [or prop-
erty] that a reasonably prudent manufacturer [supplier] with this knowledge would
not have placed it on the market.
Id. at 501 n.16, 525 P.2d at 1040-41 n.16.
32. Carcinogenic refers to the drug's cancer-producing effects, while mutagenic refers
to the structural abnormalities with which it has been associated, especially adenosis. Ade-
nosis is a non-cancerous gynecological abnormality in which glandular tissue normally grow-
ing only in the cervix is also found in the vagina. See generally Herbst, Problems, supra
note 4; Herbst, Age incidence and risk, supra, note 4.
33. Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 587, 436 N.E.2d at 189-90, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 783-84. There
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separate issue was linked to the drug manufacturer's ability to test
DES on pregnant mice, which it had failed to do.-" The appellate
division found that these jury instructions complied with New
York products liability law.36 In the court of appeals, Lilly again
raised the comment k issue, contending that since all drugs are in-
herently unsafe, liability for effects can attach only where the "side
effect"3 6 was foreseeable, and if the manufacturer omitted warn-
ings in the product enclosures.3 7 Lilly's second issue on appeal as-
serted that no liability can be found against a drug manufacturer if
the physician did not rely on product literature or warnings when
prescribing the drug. 8 The court rejected both contentions, since it
analyzed the plaintiff's case as pleaded and proven on a failure to
test theory3 9 Therefore, the court of appeals did not fully analyze
the relationship of comment k to the case, although two strong in-
ferences can be drawn. First, on a strict liability theory, the manu-
facturer's ability to foresee the harm does not necessarily have to
be proven because foreseeability is imputed to the manufacturer.
Secondly, the plaintiff does not necessarily have to show inade-
quate warning if improper marketing can be proven under another
theory, in this case, failure to make adequate pre-market tests.
40
Bichler, as we shall see, stands as a noticeable exception to many
other pharmaceutical cases.
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.41 is another case remark-
able for its analysis of comment k in relation to design defects and
failure to warn.42 The plaintiff wife suffered a stroke (cerebral
were seven charges and corresponding interrogatories which were given to the jury, all of
which were answered in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 587 n.10, 436 N.E.2d at 189 n.10, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 783 n.10.
34. Id. at 587, 436 N.E.2d at 189, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 783. It was determined that such
testing would have provided laboratory data which should have either prevented a manufac-
turer from marketing DES in 1947, or motivated the company to take it off the market by
1953. Id.
35. Id.
36. "Side-effect" appears to be a very understated term for carcinogenicity, since
"side-effect" encompasses very mild effects such as drowsiness or lack of appetite. "Adverse
reaction" or "contraindication" would more clearly convey the seriousness of a drug's can-
cer-causing propensity.
37. 55 N.Y.2d at 586, 436 N.E.2d at 189, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
38. Id.
39. 55 N.Y.2d at 587, 436 N.E.2d at 190, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 783-84.
40. Id.
41. 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 656-57. The court emphasized that the hypothetical instance of the Pasteur
vaccine in comment k suggests a balancing between the risk of certain death weighed
against a high degree of risk posed by the treatment itself. Such a balancing was found
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thrombosis) which left her partially paralyzed and prone to grand
mal seizures, depression, and difficulty in breathing and swallowing
pursuant to taking defendant's Ortho Novum 2 contraceptive pills.
At the time, defendants were also marketing birth control pills
with lower estrogen content. The court noted that in 1970 a study
had been released in the British Medical Journal concerning the
relation between high ratios of estrogen content and increased risk
of cerebral thrombosis.43 The court ruled that the manufacturer
should be held liable for continuing to market a pill inherently de-
fective in design due to its high estrogen content when it had an-
other, less risky alternative. Moreover, the manufacturer was liable
for its failure to warn physicians of the significantly higher risk of
ingesting a pill with a higher estrogen content than from a lower
dosage contraceptive." The First Circuit's analysis of the strict lia-
bility of the manufacturer in Brochu inheres in the policy which
requires a product's social utility to outweigh its risks in order to
be acceptable.45 Such a perspective on strict liability for drugs is
invited by the Restatement's example of the Pasteur vaccine in
comment k.4e The First Circuit's rationale, which attached liability
where a less dangerous alternative was available when the offend-
ing product was purchased, and where the product's unreasonably
dangerous condition caused the injury,47 has potentially extensive
application in the field of drugs today. Not only are there a myriad
of prescription drugs, which offer different options for treatment in
many cases, but also alternative courses of treatment which are
non-pharmaceutical in nature abound. When a drug company
places the risk of loss on the patient through an inadequate warn-
ing, or non-disclosure of less dangerous, substitute therapies,
helpful when determining what kind of warning would be reasonable under the circum-
stances. Id.
43. Id. at 657. The court referred to an unnamed study by Inman, Vessey, Westerholm
and Engelund, found in the British Medical Journal. Id.
44. Id. at 658-59.
45. This policy is articulated in Donaher, Piehler, Twerski and Weinstein, The Tech-
nological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1303, 1307 (1974) as
follows:
The issue in every products case is whether the product qua product meets society's
standards of acceptability. The unreasonable danger question, then, is posed in terms
of whether, given the risks and the benefits of any possible alternatives to the prod-
uct, we as a society will live with it in its existing state or will require an altered, less
dangerous form.
Id.
46. See supra notes 22 & 42 and accompanying text.
47. Brochu, 642 F.2d at 659.
1984
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should it not be held strictly liable for harm resulting from its
product?'"
The wording of comment k suggests that the absence of proper
directions and warnings renders a prescription drug defective or
unreasonably dangerous. The language of the preceding comment j
also concerns warnings for prescription drugs.49 A case interpreting
comment j which merits discussion because of the parallels which
can be drawn to drug cases and comment k is Little v. PPG Indus-
tries, Inc.50 In this wrongful death case, predicated on exposure to
a toxic cleaning agent, the lower appellate court emphatically re-
jected any argument based on the reasonableness of the manufac-
48. This view was set forth at length in Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liabil-
ity, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1091-92 (1965). He states:
If, however, the manufacturer is producing for the general public, he sets the level of
consumer's risk himself and is restrained, if at all, only by market conditions and by
the law .... [N]ow the question arises, why should the manufacturer be allowed to
pass the so-called consumer's risk on to the consumer at all? Especially the risk of
property loss or serious bodily injury resulting from a defective product? The answer
of the manufacturer that he must pass some risk on to the consumer is now met with
the reply: then pay for the damages. This is not absolute liability. It has nothing to
do with subjective fault. It has to do with compensation for a loss resulting from a
deliberately assigned risk - assigned, that is, to the other fellow.
Id.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment j (1965). Comment j addresses
the issue of warnings. Warnings are required when a product contains a harmful ingredient
that the consumer would not expect to encounter, or the danger of which he would not
know. This comment sets the stage for comment k in several ways. First, it acknowledges
that a proper warning may transform an unreasonably dangerous product into an acceptable
one. Secondly, it sets forth certain types of products which should require warnings. Finally,
its language appears to include negligence terminology of forseeability which corresponds to
the "present state of human knowledge" language of comment k. Comment j is set forth in
pertinent part:
Directions or Warning.
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be
required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use. The seller may
reasonably assume that those with common allergies ... will be aware of them....
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient and the ingredient is one whose
danger is not generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasona-
bly not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it,
if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger.
Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other reasons,
warning as to use may be required .... Where warning is given, the seller may rea-
sonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warn-
ing, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unrea-
sonably dangerous.
RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) (emphasis added).
50. 92 Wash.2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
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turer's knowledge of the dangerous condition of its product.51 The
manufacturer then sought to reverse the ruling that its knowledge
of the danger should be assumed.52  The Washington Supreme
Court then set forth an opinion which defined the problem inher-
ent in applying a negligence rationale in strict liability cases.
53 It
reasoned that the objective of strict liability is defeated if the
plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence or if the manufac-
turer may defend on the grounds of lack thereof. As the court
stated, "It is the adequacy of the warning which is given, or the
necessity of such a warning which must command the jury's atten-
tion, not the defendant's conduct. '5 4 The court went on to discuss
the role of "reasonableness" in such a case and asserted that "it is
a role which concerns itself with the sufficiency of the warning and
the expectations of the user."55 Summing up further policies in
favor of true strict liability (liability without fault) the court stated
that proof of an inadequate warning will usually be a much simpler
task than proof of the defendant's negligence, because of the acces-
sibility of the evidence. Further, the question of whether or not a
warning is adequate invokes an element of common knowledge
within the province of the jury. 6 It is apparent from this discus-
sion that the Washington court would treat any exemption from
negligence under a comment k analysis in a similar manner.
B. Plaintiff's Recovery under Strict Liability Precluded by
Comment k.
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co. 57 is one of the few prescription drug
cases where the court pursued an in-depth analysis of the role of
strict liability law in relation to pharmaceuticals. This case in-
volved another claim based on cancer and other gynecological inju-
ries related to in utero DES exposure. In its analysis, the court
addressed the fact that under New Jersey law forseeability of dan-
ger is imputed to the manufacturer of a defective machine, even if
it was in fact unknowable at the time of manufacture and
distribution.8
51. Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 822, 579 P.2d 940, 947 (1978).
52. 92 Wash.2d at 120, 594 P.2d at 913.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 121, 594 P.2d at 914.
55. Id. at 122, 594 P.2d at 914.
56. Id. at 122, 594 P.2d at 915.
57. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).
58. Id. at 576, 420 A.2d at 1318.
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According to the court, however, comment k effectively rules out
the question of imputed knowledge of the danger in drug cases,
since the language concerning liability of drug manufacturers for
dangerous defects frames the issue in terms of "the present state of
human knowledge" and "such experience as there is," s59 thus refer-
ring to the time of marketing and purchase. This court proposed
that although comment k is couched in strict liability principles it
sets forth no more than tenets of negligence." Concluding its anal-
ysis of comment k, the court reasoned that strict liability can apply
to only two situations in pharmaceutical cases: either to those
cases where the drug could not reasonably have appeared to be
useful and "desirable at the time of manufacture," or to cases
where a "medically recognizable risk foreseeably outweighed its
utility . . . despite some apparent efficacy."'" The irony of this
analysis is that one test for strict liability is whether the risk to
society outweighs the societal benefits of the product.2 If there is a
threshold requirement that the risk outweighs the benefit at the
time of manufacture in order to escape the comment k exemption
and permit a claim to be brought on a strict liability theory, in
effect, the plaintiff must prove his or her case twice. The plaintiffs
in the case under question did argue that the risk of DES out-
weighed its benefit at the time of manufacture. However, the court
dismissed their argument that if DES was ineffective in preventing
miscarriage, it was defective.6 This argument is cogent if analyzed
59. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965)). The
relevant portion of comment k provides as follows:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use .... Such a prod-
uct, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective. . . . It is. . . true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. 175 N.J. Super. at 576, 420 A.2d at 1318.
61. Id. at 577, 420 A.2d at 1319. Compare Rheingold, supra note 1, at 1001 n.304.
62. See supra note 45.
63. 175 N.J. Super. at 576, 420 A.2d at 1318. Compare Rheingold, supra note 1, at
1008-09, where the author draws a graphic analogy between ineffective drugs and mechani-
cal safety devices which do not work properly:
In a situation in which an ethical drug fails to cure a certain disease which it purports
to cure, reliance upon the drug by the doctor and his patient may aggravate the pa-
tient's condition and leave him with a permanent disability which he would not have
suffered had he been administered another, more effective medicine. Such a lack of
efficacy in a drug may be caused either by an inherent lack of ability to cure or by a
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in the light that there can be no real benefit if a drug is ineffective
for the purpose for which it is marketed and used by the consumer.
Such a lack of effectiveness is tantamount to design defect." Fur-
ther, if a manufacturer induces reliance on a product which fails to
be effective for that purpose, there appears to be a breach of war-
ranty. Using Comment language, such a drug could not be consid-
ered to be "apparently useful and desirable." From any perspec-
tive, it would seem that the risk of such a drug must necessarily tip
the scales against being beneficial.
In another recent case, Gaston v. Hunter,65 a plaintiff's disc dis-
ease was aggravated through the use of chymopapain, an investiga-
tional drug intended to provide an alternative to disc surgery. The
plaintiff asserted that the drug was unreasonably dangerous and
defective in that it was ineffective for the purpose for which it was
marketed and prescribed, and, secondly, that it was highly toxic
and injurious to human tissue.66 Although some evidence of prod-
uct defect was erroneously excluded at trial,67 and the trial court
below refused to give strict liability jury instructions, the Arizona
Appellate Court ruled that this was not prejudicial to the plaintiff
defective batch from which the active ingredient has been omitted. The question
posed in this section is whether there is or should be manufacturer liability in such a
situation, or in one in which a vaccine fails to give immunity to a disease, or where an
oral contraceptive fails to prevent an unwanted pregnancy? . . . As to the inherent
lack of drug efficacy-analogous to design fault-such a suit is virtually without pre-
cedent in the ethical drug area. Other types of products liability cases predicated
upon safety devices that did not function might be analogized to inefficacious drug
cases and thus provide a basis for liability. While it is true that in safety device cases
liability has been found because of unsafeness and not inefficacy, still it was the fail-
ure to live up to the created expectations of positive performances that underlay
liability. Inducing use and creating reliance based upon a false sense of usefulness
constitute the culpable conduct of the supplier. Beyond an action for negligence or
for negligent misrepresentation, an express warranty action might also be available in
the case of an ineffective drug, since such a drug is used only because the manufac-
turer has claimed it to be proper for a certain condition, and it has not lived up to
that express promise.
Id. at 1008-09 (emphasis added).
Rheingold's analogy between non-functional safety devices and drugs that are ineffective
for their claimed purpose makes sense. The Ferrigno court also drew a logical comparison
between machines and drugs, but stopped short of the rational outcome of its reasoning.
Comment k became an effective roadblock to imputing knowledge to the manufacturer of an
injurious product. The Ferrigno court claimed that the comment k phrases "[i]n the present
state of human knowledge" and "such experience as there is" distinguish drug cases from
the machine cases. See 175 N.J. Super. at 576, 420 A.2d at 1318. See also supra note 59.
64. See Rheingold, supra note 1, at 1008-09.
65. 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (1978).
66. Id. at 40, 588 P.2d at 331.
67. Id. at 46 n.10, 588 P.2d at 339 n.10.
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because "none of the erroneously excluded evidence would tend to
provide that missing element of breach of the drug companies'
duty."" s Breach of duty is obviously a negligence concept, foreign
to product liability doctrine. This court would seem to draw no
distinction between negligence and strict liability actions for drug
injuries, because it proceeds to use the prudent person standard in
judging the manufacturer's conduct.6 ' This is a far cry from
Kimwood in which knowledge was imputed to the manufacturer.7 0
In another contraceptive pill case, Seley v. G.D. Searle7 1 a wo-
man of twenty-six suffered a stroke which left her numb and par-
tially paralyzed.7 2 The plaintiffs asserted that the manufacturer
failed to adequately warn of the dangers associated with its birth
control pill, Ovulen.7 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed a ver-
dict for the manufacturer on the grounds that the trial court com-
mitted error by introducing negligence theories into the language
of the jury charge which read in pertinent part:
[If Searle] made available adequate warnings to the medical profession to
summarize medical or scientific information reasonably known or discovera-
ble by said defendants in the exercise of ordinary care at the time Ovulen-
21 was prescribed for the plaintiff, the defendants Searle complied with
their duty to give warning.
[Wihen I use the words 'ordinary care,' I mean the care that a reasonably
careful pharmaceutical company would use under circumstances similar to
those shown by the evidence .7
The court of appeals objected to such language, in that it diverted
the jury's attention from the condition of the product itself to the
conduct of the manufacturer, thus evading the purpose of strict
liability law. The Seley court underscored its point with language
from a Colorado court in a similar case where it was stated that
"[i]t is of no import whether this drug manufacturer's warning
comported with the warning a reasonably prudent drug manufac-
turer would have given. '' 5 Nevertheless, on appeal the Ohio Su-
68. Id. at 45, 588 P.2d at 338.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 31.
71. 67 Ohio St.2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (1981).
72. Id. at 194, 423 N.E.2d at 835.
73. Id. at 195, 423 N.E.2d at 835. The basis of the plaintiff's claim was that Searle
provided no information concerning the dangers of the pill to women who had a history of
toxemia in pregnancy. Id.
74. Id. at 198, 423 N.E.2d at 837.
75. Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976). See Seley, 67 Ohio
St.2d 199, 423 N.E.2d 837. Hamilton was also a Searle birth control case in which an ap-
peals court reversed the trial court for refusal to instruct the jury that the manufacturer
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preme Court shifted the standard back to one of reasonableness,
asserting that such language does not necessarily transform the
measure of proof into that of negligence."' Such disagreement be-
tween two appellate courts in the same state graphically illustrates
the confusion comment k has generated. While some courts hold
that comment k exempts drug companies from strict liability,
others assert that it merely employs the same language as negli-
gence concepts.7
De Luryea v. Winthrop Laboratories7 8 is a case set in Arkansas
in which the plaintiff sued for injuries resulting from the use of
Talwin, a prescribed pain killer. De Luryea not only suffered
mental and physical injuries from addiction to the drug, but also
developed tissue ulceration and necrosis at the injection sites. 9
The case was brought on a failure to warn theory in strict liability.
When the Eighth Circuit heard the case on appeal to determine
whether evidence of the manufacturer's change in warnings on the
package insert should have been admitted below, the court stated
that the rule barring evidence of subsequent remedial changes had
not been extended to products cases brought in strict liability in
the Eighth Circuit.80 The rationale was that the evidence would
not be used to prove negligence in such cases.8' Prescription drug
cases, however, demand different treatment, according to the
court. A plaintiff must prove negligence in drug cases brought on a
strict liability theory.8" Supporting this proposition, the court com-
pared the jury instructions used in the district court which were
nearly identical to those used in negligence cases. Further, they
looked to the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Werner v. Upjohn
Company,8" where it was decided that the difference between strict
liability and negligence in a warning case disappeared under close
analysis." The Eighth Circuit further reasoned that a claim re-
garding an "unavoidably dangerous drug" closed the gap between
negligence and strict liability completely. Therefore, a plaintiff in
could be held strictly liable for failure to warn about risks. 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099.
76. 67 Ohio St.2d at 199, 423 N.E.2d at 837.
77. See McClellan, supra note 5 (discussion of drug liability cases).
78. 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983).
79. Necrosis is the pathologic death of living tissue. WESTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 768 (1977).
80. 697 F.2d at 227-28.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 228-29.




the circumstances similar to those in De Luryea must prove culp-
able conduct.8 5 Total deterioration of the purpose and intent of the
strict liability standard is therefore shown in De Luryea.8 The
plaintiff is severely impeded from proving negligence because of
the nature of the evidence which is probative in the case. Although
such evidence would be admitted in other strict products liability
cases to demonstrate the unreasonably dangerous quality of the
product, the plaintiff here is effectively prevented from making her
case because an exemption from strict liability has been created for
the defendant.
C. Summary of the Strict Liability Concepts in the Foregoing
I Cases
The array of policies and legal concepts exemplified in the previ-
ous cases can be distilled into a group of principles representing
the vacillating status of strict liability law in regard to ethical drug
companies today.
First, present scientific knowledge of a drug's dangerous propen-
sities is imputed to a drug manufacturer under a failure to test
theory.1 'Yet, a jury must determine if the manufacturer would
have been "reasonable" in putting the drug on the market.8 8 This
approach applies strict liability principles coupled with negligence
doctrine.
Second, risk-benefit assessment of a product and whether or not
the accompanying warning was reasonable in light of the availabil-
ity of a much less dangerous alternative product utilizes strict lia-
bility principles.89 Further, the imputation to the manufacturer of
scientific knowledge about the product's contents is consonant
with strict liability doctrine in a failure to warn case.90
Third, the reasonableness of a manufacturer's knowledge of a
dangerous condition in its product is irrelevant in a failure to warn
theory. Rather, the adequacy of the warning itself as a part of the
total concept of the marketed product is at issue.91
Finally, a policy that drug companies should not be charged with
knowledge of a dangerous defect at the time of manufacture is cur-
85. 697 F.2d at 229.
86. Compare this decision to the court's rationale in Hamilton, supra note 71.
87. Bichler v. Eli Lilly, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1981).
88. Id. at 587, 436 N.E.2d at 190, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
89. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1981).
90. Id. at 657. See Phillips, supra note 31; Hamilton, supra note 75.
91. Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., 92 Wash.2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
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rent law in many jurisdictions. Foreseeability, reasonableness,
breach of duty, ordinary care and other aspects of negligence law
have been deemed appropriate measures of culpable conduct in
pharmaceutical cases espousing this viewpoint.9
2
IV. DRUG COMPANIES AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE: WILL HOLDING
DRUG COMPANIES TO STRICT LIABILITY INHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NEW DRUGS?
One of the reasons behind the reluctance of courts to hold drug
manufacturers to strict liability standards is the fear that such ac-
countability would deter pharmaceutical companies from develop-
ing new drugs.93 When viewing policies underlying strict liability, it
must be realized that no matter what precautions are taken, and
regardless of the extent to which pre-market research and testing
is engaged in, some risk will be passed to the consumer. 4 Yet, the
purpose of strict liability is to assure that the entity which trans-
fers the risk to the consumer will ultimately pay for the injuries
caused by the products.
9 5
Comment k of section 402A implies a policy which favors giving
preferential treatment to drug companies because of the kind of
products they manufacture and market." Therefore, rather than
objectively viewing the pharmaceutical industry as the profit-ori-
ented business that it is, an exemption from strict liability has
placed the industry in the category of those entities which can only
be sued on the basis of professional negligence. 7 A close look at
92. DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983); Gaston v. Hunter, 121
Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (1978); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305
(1980); Seley v. Searle, 67 Ohio St.2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (1981).
93. See Note, supra note 1, where it is contended that any impediment to drug com-
panies placing new drugs on the market would inevitably result in detriment to the con-
sumer. See also Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 189 N.J. Super. 424, 428-29, 460 A.2d 203, 205
(1983), where the court stated that:
The underlying reason for special exemption of prescription drugs is the public policy
concern that imposition of strict liability, or, perhaps more accurately stated, the al-
most absolute liability, principle of the Beshada approach would chill, if not smother,
the research, development, production and marketing of new or experimental drugs
necessary to alleviate or cure the ills to which we are all subject.
Id. (referring to the approach taken in an earlier case involving workers exposed to asbestos,
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982)).
94. See Cowan, supra note 48.
95. Id. See also Rheingold, supra note 1; Keeton, supra note 1; McClellan, supra note 5.
96. See supra notes 6 & 20.
97. These include physicians, nurses, pharmacists, hospitals, and lawyers. See also Mc-
Clellan, supra note 5, at 33, for a discussion of the "wealth distribution preference" given
drug companies to the detriment of consumers.
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the pharmaceutical industry should mitigate the fear that strict li-
ability would deter pharmaceutical companies from developing
new drugs. First, the industry, although it produces an array of
beneficial commodities for public health, has a strong profit motive
which it readily acknowledges.9" Obviously, drug companies are in
the business of developing and promoting new drugs, and, as in
any other enterprise, it pays to have new products to put on the
market. A striking and essential difference exists between the de-
velopment of the Pasteur treatment for rabies (the named example
of an unavoidably unsafe product set forth in comment k), penicil-
lin, the polio vaccines, and most ethical drugs on the market today.
Those early examples of medical pioneering were developed with a
view toward urgent public health needs by independent scientists
with no apparent motive for pecuniary gain, Whereas today most
pharmaceuticals are developed in large drug houses on the basis of
potential market value.9" A clear example of the underlying profit
motive in drug development and marketing is found in the devel-
opment of the drug Panalba. 1°° Panalba was a fixed ratio combina-
tion of tetracycline with novobiocin, a dangerous antibiotic. The
drug had negligible therapeutic value, but, rather, was merely a
new substance created by combining two other antibiotics. 01 Al-
though the two-drug combination was less effective than tetracy-
cline itself, it was clearly an instance of a drug created for a market
rather than a medical purpose. 10 2 The unsuspecting patient obvi-
ously bears the risk of harm in such an instance.
Bendectin, another example of a combination drug, was a pill
first marketed in 1956 for the treatment of nausea and vomiting in
pregnancy.103 Bendectin's original ingredients were: dicyclomine,
98. As one pharmaceutical executive has stated:
Searle Laboratories' philosophy for the promotion and sale of our pharmaceutical
products is based on the concept that the generation of profit as a result of marketing
pharmaceuticals is not only legally acceptable, but is morally and ethically desirable.
We take the position that marketing and sales activities are essential to the discovery
and development of new methods of improving the well-being of patients both now
and in the future.
Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 1249-
50 (1974) (statement of James A. Buzzard, Ph. D., President, Searle Laboratories) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Pharmaceutical Hearings].
99. See Pharmaceutical Hearings, supra note 98, at 137-138 (statement by chairman,
Senator Edward Kennedy). See id. at 138 (statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson).
100. See id. at 138 (statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Bendectin was originally marketed by Merrell National Laboratories, now Merrell
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an antispasmodic, doxylamine, an antihistamine, and Vitamin B6,
pyridoxine. In 1976, dicyclomine was removed, as it was shown not
to contribute to the effectiveness of the pill.104 Since that time
many birth defects have been associated with the drug,105 and it
was withdrawn from the market in 1983. Although the marketing
of Bendectin had a legitimate medical purpose, the practice of in-
cluding an extra, ineffective ingredient in any pill, especially one to
be promoted for use in pregnancy is clearly questionable. Hope-
fully not all pharmaceutical developments are so blatantly unbal-
anced in their risk-benefit proportions. Yet, even those drugs
which have a very high value in the treatment of serious illnesses
are often ruthlessly marketed. Mellaril, a psychotropic drug often
used in the treatment of manic-depression and other psychic disor-
ders offers an example of aggressive marketing techniques. The fol-
lowing is an excerpt from the marketing directives given to sales-
men who promoted Mellaril:
Continue to detail Mellaril until you have convinced the physician to use
this drug. This is your sole mission. In many cases, you will be able to re-
mind the physician about our headache line along with selling him Mellaril.
But do not let anything interfere with your doing a complete sales job on
Mellaril.
It is imperative that you get Mellaril stocked in every possible hospital.
This is the first big hurdle.
The tests showed that what a buyer hears first, he retains the longest. If the
benefits are listed before the drawbacks, a 'that's for me' state of mind is
created. If the drawbacks are given first, a 'no thanks' attitude is created.'"
Although these marketing strategies may not differ greatly from
those used in other industries, it is apparent that the psychological
techniques used in such sales ploys cannot help but undermine the
value of any warnings. That such marketing techniques are suc-
cessful is not denied. The fiscal strength exhibited by the leading
drug companies was set forth by a former F.D.A. Commissioner,
Dr. James Goddard:
Profitability has long been the hallmark of the pharmaceutical industry.
Year after year the industry ranks first or second in after-tax income as a
Dow, a division of Richardson Merrell. For a reference to litigation concerning this drug, see
supra note 4.
104. Legislation enacted in 1976 required information on drug efficacy to be submitted
to the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 et. seq. (1976).
105. See supra note 4.




percentage of net worth. This profitability has been maintained by the drug
industry even though drug prices have not climbed as rapidly as consumer
prices in general.1
0 7
At the same congressional hearings wherein Dr. Goddard's com-
ments were introduced, the drug companies rebuttal to Dr. God-
dard's views were discussed as follows:
The drug companies generally argue that they are entitled to such high
profits because of the risks involved in developing new drugs. Indeed, drug
companies do spend a sizeable 6.5% of their revenue on Research and De-
velopment. However, the risk dollars for Research and Development are
dwarfed by the safe dollars for marketing. A full 25% of the total sales dol-
lar goes for marketing. . . . Even if there was a "risk" in developing drugs,
the kind of marketing clout the drug companies have would reduce it to
zero.
No major pharmaceutical house has been forced out of business in the past
25 years; if there were a significant risk, enough to justify these enormous
profits, we would expect to see occasional losses."'
The polio vaccine crisis is an excellent case in point of the
bouyancy of drug companies in the face of extensive verdicts and
settlements.109 Richardson-Merrell, for example, evidences another
instance of continuing fiscal viability in spite of the numerous ac-
tions that have been brought against it in the past twenty years as
the producer of both MER/29 and Bendectin. 110
VI. CONCLUSION
The drug industry is as much a profit-oriented business as any
other in this country. That drugs are dangerous commodities in
themselves is patently clear. Whereas other ultrahazardous activi-
ties must finance their own way in the marketplace through abso-
lute liability standards,"' pharmaceutical companies have been
given preferential treatment by the judiciary on the basis that
drugs are unavoidably unsafe. Drug companies do have the
financial means to diminish the unsafe qualities of many of the
107. Id. at 239-40 (testimony of Herbert S. Denenberg, Pennsylvania Insurance Com-
missioner) (quoting Goddard, The Medical Business, 229 Sci. AM., Sept. 1973 at 161-66).
108. Pharmaceutical Hearings, supra note 98, at 240 (testimony of Herbert S.
Denenberg, Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner).
109. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1960). See
Rheingold, supra note 1, at 1017 (citing How Cutter Came Back, in Bus. WK. Feb. 24, 1962
at 139, in which a discussion is undertaken of the fiscal recovery of this drug company which
lost $4 million on the recall of its polio vaccine).
110. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
111. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, §§ 519-524A (1976).
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drugs they market. Furthermore, drug companies have the capabil-
ity and the responsibility as the prime source of drug information
to physicians to advise and warn of other less risky courses of
treatment when a particular drug is especially dangerous. Not only
must drug companies demonstrate integrity in a willingness to ac-
cept responsibility for their products through adequate testing, re-
search, development and physician education, but especially in ac-
cepting financial responsibility for injuries created by these
products.
The confusion of negligence concepts and strict liability in the
judicial resolution of drug-related litigation can only undermine
the purpose of strict liability law. Pharmaceutical companies
should be held to the same standard of liability as other industries
or a great disservice to injured victims will continue.
Patty Coleman Selker

